When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler

David M. Glantz and Jonathan House

St. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995; Pages: 414

This work supposedly presents a ``fundamentally new interpretation'' of the war on the Eastern Front (the real World War II). Glantz, how is one of the foremost American experts on WWII-EF, and who has published extensively in the area, presents his (and House's) ongoing research in the area, interpreting the events in the light of recently declassified Soviet-era Russian documents.

The Events Leading to War

Given the importance of the 1939-40 events (diplomatic and military), the book is surprisingly cursory in its treatment of the period. The section (Prelude: 1918-1941) outlines the developments in the organization, equipment, and military doctrine of the Red Army (Chap.1), discusses the uneasy truce following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Chap.2), and ``compares'' the two opposing armies (Chap.3). This part is an abysmal effort at preserving current historical misconceptions and omissions.

Chapter 1 (p.7-10) details the development of the Soviet concept of Deep Operation, an exclusively offensive strategy that relies on lightning and crushing mechanized corps (Blitzkrieg, anyone?). Perhaps predictably, the authors credit Tukhachevsky with this innovation---the ``brilliant'' commander who was decisively routed by the Poles in 1920. This quibble aside, G&H point to Stalin's embrace of the concept as the source of the drive to industrialization, as well as the explanation of the scope of Soviet effort (p.9). This is doubtless correct: One only needs to be briefly reminded of the half-hearted efforts of the Germans to put their economy on war-time footing even after the beginning of the war. However, having stated that the Red Army clearly enjoyed a massive advantage in the 1930s, G&H go on to dismiss its power... because of the political purges in 1937-9!

This is an old trick: since we can't explain why the Red Army, which was had modern tanks and weapons by the thousands and which was clearly stronger than the Wehrmacht, suffered the disasters of 1941-2, we simply blame the purges. First, G&H are not convincing about the reasons of the purges in the army: ``Stalin remained uncomfortable with innovative theorists such as Tukhachevsky... [he] valued loyalty, orthodoxy, and intellectual subservience'' (p.11). What is the basis of this assertion? Stalin did not punish Zhukov (among others) for speaking out, demoted his favorite crony Voroshilov after the Winter War, and generally submitted to expert judgment if he could be convinced. That most people were reluctant to try to convince him, is understandable. But Stalin seems to have respect for only one thing: demonstrable ability, not words. Second, it is not clear how damaging the purges were. The authors say that 30,000 were imprisoned or executed, two VERY different fates lumped into one. About 15% of the imprisoned ones were reinstated (e.g. Rokossovsky, p.12). Old Civil War commanders were replaced by young and successful ones, like Zhukov. It is also not clear how many of the purged ones were Communist political commissars, the one useless position in the Army. It may be true that the fear instilled indecision and suspicion in the officers (p.13), but such officers were quickly ridden of. On the other hand, commanders that delivered (e.g. Khalkhin-Gol), rose to prominence.

Chapter 2 deals with the period between the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the German invasion. The Poles and Rumanians were clearly the reason why Stalin could not help the Czechs before Munich despite his efforts to do so. G&H, however, downplay his unsuccessful negotiations with the British and the French for a common stand against Hitler. The authors simply lie when they suggest that Germany was ``suspicious of Soviet overtures'' (p.16) when the fact is that it was the Germans who sought out the Soviets and it was Molotov who was suspicious of their intentions (and even refused to deal with their initial attempts). The deal with Germany came only after Stalin had realized the futility of his hopes for Br-Fr alliance. So, the question remains, why the Pact?

The Winter War is a much neglected topic that I will have to cover elsewhere. For now, it suffices to say that G&H swallow the common view uncritically. According to this view, the Soviets suffered a humiliating victory over the Finns, which exposed the weakness in their military preparedness. But... it simply was not like that. First, the Soviets won. They had to attack in a narrow region that made numerical superiority more of a liability than threat (cf. the ill-fated 44th Rifle Division's fate, p.21). They had to attack in almost arctic-like weather (no other army has done it). They had to deal with poor preparation because the war was so hastily declared. They had to breach the Mannerheim Line defended with well-equipped Finns. They initially had 550,000 men against between 500,000 and 600,000 Finns (not exactly an overwhelming difference). The Russians won nevertheless. After the first disastrous setbacks, Timoshenko and Mertskov were given command, which they used to re-organize and re-group. When the attack was renewed on Feb 12, 1940, the Russians breached the Line and the Finns sued for peace on Mar 13 (pp.22-3). The learning experience had paid off but it also prompted further reforms in the army (pp.23-5). This, according to the authors, was defeat because Moscow had failed to achieve outright annexation (it is not clear that Stalin ever intended that) and because the losses were disproportionate to the gains (not true, if one takes into account the consequences).

The consequences of the Winter War were also dramatic: the Baltic states ``agreed'' to annexation without a fight two months after the war and the Germans (and not only they) drew the wrong conclusions about the strength of the Red Army. How the Germans failed to account for the inevitable learning process remains a mystery, but bias against the Russians is probably the culprit. The reforms were important: political commissars were demoted and command restored to the officers (p.23), the decisions of the Kulik Commission were reversed and the War Commissariat authorized the creation of 29 mechanized corps (that's 30,000 tanks and 1,000,000 troops). Finally, the war was a winnowing process, which eliminated ineffective commanders.

In conclusion of Soviet preparations, the authors mention the ``creeping up to war'' mobilization which had a secret phase (underway since 1937), and an overt phase which was supposed to start after the beginning of war. Obviously, for this to work the Soviets had to know when the war would start (i.e. start one themselves). The authors curiously omit discussion of that process. They state that ``despite these prudent efforts, the Soviet Union was not ready for war in June 1941, nor did it intend ... to launch a preventive war'' (p.27). BUT! G&H do not discuss the strange demolition of the Stalin Line, or the odd concentration of troops ALONG the border, not in depth, as dictated by a strategy of defense, or any of the many strange facts. They do not explain why Stalin refused to believe reports of the coming war to the last. ``Hope clouded reality'' is their take, but this is wishful thinking.

February 12, 2001. BLS

@BOOK{glantz-95:titans,
    TITLE     = {When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler},
    AUTHOR    = {David M. Glantz and Jonathan House},
    YEAR      = {1995},
    PUBLISHER = {University Press of Kansas},
    ADDRESS   = {St. Lawrence},
    ISBN      = {0-7006-0899-0},
    NOTE      = {Pp. 414}
}