War By Time-Table: How the First World War Began

A.J.P. Taylor

New York: American Heritage, 1969; Pages: 127

There were no profound causes for WWI. For thirty years, diplomacy, the balance of power, and the alliances had produced peace. Suddenly, the very forces that had produced the long peace now produced a great war (p.45). "The sole cause for the outbreak of the war in 1914 was the Schlieffen Plan---product of the belief in speed and the offensive" (p.121). Thus, the single event which turned the localized Balkan conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia into a European war, was the German decision to start general mobilization on July 31 (p.101). There was no popular demand for war (p.119) and economic factors, often cited as reasons for the war, were the primary restraining mechanism (p.40).

Summary of Arguments and Subsidiary Points

Mobilization. The essential European balance was between the Franco-Russian and the Austro-German alliances (p.9). Despite the alliances, states relied on their own strength, especially the armies and the attending operation---mobilization. The universal doctrine was that "whichever power completed its mobilization first would strike first and might even win the war before the other side was ready" (p.15).

The mobilization plans had some odd features: (i) they had never been tried in practice; (ii) they allowed no margin of error and assumed peacetime conditions while ignoring possible enemy moves; (iii) no staff officers outside Russia had any fighting experience; (iv) improvisation was impossible, the plans were immutable to the last detail; (v) plans did not allow for the political conditions surrounding the possible outbreak of war, they were made without input from civilian diplomats and politicians; (vi) allies did not share enough information or coordinate their plans (pp.16-9).

Only the German Schlieffen Plan allowed for no breathing space between mobilization and war (p.25). The Germans had only a plan for defeating France and no other (p.100). The four armies had to pass through Aachen (to use the narrow 80 mile gap between the Ardennes and Holland) but this meant that the first army had to be on its way before the second arrived and so on. Thus, once Germans began to mobilize, war inevitably followed on the second or third day (p.26).

The Russian and Austrian plans provided that the commanders would decide what to do after mobilization; the French had only one thing to do---defend the frontiers against Germany; and even though the British could decided whether to enter the war or not, they could not decide how, they could only go to Maubeuge and cooperate with the French (p.31). "On the surface at least, all the plans were defensive. All, even that of the Germans, were designed to win a war if one happened, not to bring one about. The statesmen, not the commanders, brought on the outbreak of war in 1914" (p.32).

Europe before the war. None of the statesmen wanted war. Europe was peaceful, prosperous, and there was plenty of room in the world up for imperialist grabs. "Industrial and financial interests were everywhere pulling the rich together against the poor and backward, and economic factors which have been blamed for the First World War, were in fact the greatest security of peace" (p.40). There was universal suffrage in France, Germany, Italy, Austria (not in Hungary), and household suffrage in the UK. "This was a springtime of radical confidence" (p.41) but although the prestige of the old ruling classes was declining, their wealth was increasing. The Germans believed their country was the greatest of the powers and felt she was receiving less than her due. The demand for a "place in the sun" was harmless except many Germans started to believe they had to exercise some control over Europe. "Assertiveness, though not perhaps open aggressiveness, had become a predominant German characteristic before 1914" (p.45).

Decision in Vienna. "Princip and his friends made their own decisions and did not take orders from the Black Hand" (p.56). Although the Austrians looked for proof of Serbian complicity in the assassination, they never found any. The problem was the very existence of Serbia---it represented the national principle. Therefore, the only solution was for Serbia to cease to exist, which was impossible. Emperor Franz Joseph left foreign affairs to his foreign minister, Count Berchtold. After finding out partial mobilization was impossible (according to the time-tables), Berchtold consulted the Hungarian PM, Tisza, and resolved to move only if Germany approved. In Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm and his chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg had been blaming Austria-Hungary for being fearful and irresolute and now could only encourage her. Moreover, they were confident Russia would back down and make no effective protest. Berchtold was been enthusiastic as long as there was someone to restrain him. With German support, he hesitated and waited until July 14 to produce the note to Serbia (postponed again under pretext that with Poincaré in St. Petersburg, the time was not propitious---another month of delay, until July 23).

At first, Serbia decided to accept the demands almost unconditionally. They changed their minds at the last minute for unknown reasons (p.78-9). On the 25th, Serbia accepted the Austrian note with some conditions, which Austria found unacceptable and mobilized. In Berchtold's words, "mobilization does not mean war." However, Bethmann's prodding for a localized war, finally pushed Austria-Hungary into war, which Berchtold resolved on after finding out Austria's mobilization would not be complete until August 12, enough time to solve the diplomatic impasse (p.80). Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28. "Men in Vienna started a Balkan war [...] It depended on other powers whether it would grow into a European war, and it depended most of all on men in Berlin" (p.85).

Decision in Berlin. Kaiser Wilhelm II proposed the Halt in Belgrade solution, which could have ended the crisis, but the Austrians rejected it. Bethmann also worked against the Kaiser---"a check, if not humiliation for Russia was an essential part of his policy" (p.87). Tsar Nicholas ordered partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary even though in Russia, this was all but impossible to implement. Bethmann did not understand the significance of the difference between full and partial mobilization and sent a message to Sazonov warning that "further progress of Russian mobilization would compel us to mobilize" (p.91). The Tsar, convinced by Sazonov that war with Germany was inevitable, ordered full mobilization July 30th. On the 31st, without knowledge of the Russian mobilization, Berchtold ordered the full mobilization in Austria-Hungary (encouraged by Moltke). Thus, each side provided the justification for the other's act without knowing it (p.96). Still, this was merely raising of the tension. The decision for war was taken on July 31st in Berlin. Assuming that mobilization for Russia meant war (as it did for Germany), Bethmann lost interest in avoiding a war and became concerned only with winning it. Germany delivered an ultimatum to Russia to halt and reverse mobilization (Sazonov explained Russia's measures were only precautionary), and to France to promise not to mobilize (Vivani replied France would follow her interests). "Once the rulers of Germany decided that general mobilization was their only means of safety, war had begun for all practical purposes" (p.101). On August 1, Germany declared war on Russia, and on the 3rd, she declared war on France (the ultimatum to Belgium was delivered on the 2nd).

Decision in London. This decision lay with the Cabinet, as Grey could not conduct an independent foreign policy even if he wished to. The British officers did not foresee the German invasion of Belgium and even though the French knew about the accumulated marshaling yards at Aachen, they refused to believe that reservists would be useful as soldiers (pp.105-6). Almost half of the Liberal Cabinet were against entering the war and they resolved on a limited show of support for France---they sent a message warning Germany that Great Britain would not allow a German fleet to enter the Channel and attack French shipping or ports (p.106). Germany attached the condition that Britain must remain neutral, which was rejected. In the meantime, Belgium had decided to defend her neutrality and the German ultimatum (August 2) to her became known in the Cabinet. Morley resigned and the Cabinet decided to ask Germany to respect Belgian neutrality (with no time limit or threat). As the news of German soldiers crossing the Belgian frontier reached London by noon on the 4th, Grey, acting essentially on his own, dispatched an ultimatum to Germany. This was refused and Britain declared war on Germany (pp.109-11). Austria-Hungary, the one state that started it all, was still at war only with Serbia. On the 6th, she declared war on Russia; on the 12th, France and Britain declared war on Austria-Hungary.

Subjects with Factual Information

Good history of the Sarajevo assassination---Princip, acting on his own, without complicity of the Serb government or even the nationalist Black Hand (pp.47-58).

Historiographical Observations

A controversial monograph which argues that the reason for the German decision to mobilize caused First World War because statesmen were unable to control the imperatives of their war-plans.

Bibliographical Notes

No footnotes, no bibliography. B&W photographs, index.

March 2, 2001. BLS

@BOOK{taylor-69:time-table,
    TITLE     = {War By Time-Table: How the First World War Began},
    AUTHOR    = {{A. J. P.} Taylor},
    YEAR      = {1969},
    PUBLISHER = {American Heritage},
    ADDRESS   = {New York},
    ISBN      = {0-356-02818-6},
    NOTE      = {Pp. 127, many photographs}
}