Taliban:
Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia

Ahmed Rashid

Yale University Press, 2001; Pages: 279

In this eminently readable book, veteran journalist Ahmed Rashid provides his account of the rise and success of the Taliban phenomenon in Afghanistan. The account is divided in three topical parts (which may make it harder to digest as one has to keep the chronology straight) covering the history of the movement, the extremist brand of Islam espoused by it, and the "New Great Game" of world oil and gas interests that have fueled the civil war during the last decade. Extensive research, personal interviews, and an intimate knowledge of the region and its particular problems enable Rashid to deliver a lucid analysis that, despite some misgivings on my part, should provide for a firm basis of understanding the politics of this troubled region.

The Taliban (plural for talib, an Islamic student seeking knowledge) are predominantly of the Pashtun ethnic stock that makes for 40% of Afghanistan's population and that has traditionally had the leading role in Kabul. This group populates the southern part of the country, with the north divided between Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmenis, and the center to the east of Kabul occupied by Hazaras. All except the Tajiks are of Turkic origin and all except the Hazaras are of the Sunni sect of Islam. Most members of the Taliban have never lived in Afghanistan, having been raised in neighboring Pakistan, where they received primitive education at the various madrassas (religious schools run by semi-literate ulema, or religious scholars).

The first part of the book details the rise of the Taliban from a local force around Kandahar organized under the leadership of Mullah Mohammed Omar. The small group of students made their name by freeing the local populace from the tyranny and arbitrary exploitation of the many petty warlords plundering their countryside. Refusing to accept payment and guided by religious zeal, the Taliban swept across the country quickly capturing the majority of the provinces between 1994 and 1996. Wherever they went, they imposed their own strict interpretation of the Sharia (Islamic Law), which consisted of excluding women from social life and banning any form of entertainment, along with harsh penalties for various sundry crimes. In their conquest, the Taliban had to contend with the predominantly Tajik government controlled by President Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul, various warlords like the Uzbek Reshid Dostum, or Ismael Khan (who held Herat), or Gulbuddin Hikmetyar (who held the region east of Kabul), or the Tajik Masud.

It will do injustice to the complicated story to attempt to summarize it here, but the argument boils down to the existence of a power vacuum following Soviet withdrawal in 1988, a time during which various factions and tribes vied for control of the country even as the President held out in Kabul. The communist structures had disintegrated, and were completely discredited, at the same time the Mujaheddin have transformed from liberators to petty thieves and plunderers, also losing the support of the populace, and the tribal leaders, usually a moderating force for unification, have been destroyed. Rashid sees the interest games of the regional and world powers as the reason such conflict was allowed to escalate and degenerate into ethnic and religious cleansing.

There are several strong contending interests in the region. First, Pakistan, with its security obsession against India, has seen its influence in Afghanistan as a sine qua non of any regime in its neighbor. Much talk of "strategic depth" (whatever the term may mean) have prompted the ISI (the Pakistani intelligence services) to prop the Mujaheddin, with US and Chinese connivance, during the heady days of the Cold War and the struggle against the Soviets. After the withdrawal of the USSR, Pakistan had poured money, logistical support, and goods to help their favored warlord (Hikmetyar) in his attempts to capture Kabul. When the Sunni Taliban emerged on the scene, the ISI was doubtful of their promise but after the 1996 fall of Kabul, they transferred their support to the new force, even recognizing it (prematurely as it turned out) in 1998 when the Taliban took Mazar-e-Sharif, the stronghold of the opposition forces, for the first time. In this, Pakistan was supported by Saudi Arabia, whose money and Wahhabism poured in, importing various terrorists of the Bin Laden ilk. The latter would become more wary when the Taliban proved to be out of control.

The other great contender in the region is Shia Iran, whose deep distrust of the fundamentalist and extremist Sunni tendencies of its neighbors have prompted it to support the opposition. At first Iran provided weapons and money to the Hazaras but then started to assist all the opposition forces, including Masud. In this, Iran found a friend in Russia, which eyed the rise of fundamentalism with apprehension because it threatened the stability of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and even Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan) and correspondingly undermined Russian influence in its own backyard. The Russians also assisted the opposition.

The rivalries of the great powers removed any incentives for the warlords to reach some form of accommodation. As long as the money was coming, there was no need to find a modus vivendi with the others. Even as the Taliban conquered 90% of the country, Russia and the CIS vowed not to allow it complete control. By that time, Pakistan was experiencing the backlash of the forces it had helped to unleash: drugs, black market, smuggling, extremism, and a foundering economy led to the virtual collapse of the state, which, coupled with rampant corruption and inability to check their protégés, meant that now Pakistan had become a prisoner of its own shortsighted policy.

Rashid bluntly characterizes the Taliban as extremist and obscurantist, saying that these traits come from the total lack of proper education that has left them ignorant of the history of their own country. Instead of seeking tolerant accommodation with the other ethnic and religious groups, a necessary feature of all Afghan governments until today, they have imposed their parochial interpretation of the Koran on the vibrant and populous urban centers, creating an exodus of professionals badly needed to restore the economy. Refusing to outline any coherent policy, the Taliban continue to issue edicts that ban normal human activity, and in their singling out of women for especially denigrating treatment, have made themselves odious in the eyes of the international community. The end result was the drastic curtailment of aid from the West at a time when over half of Kabul's population depended on it.

Rashid also discusses the role of the opium trade, the most lucrative economic activity under the Taliban. He traces the effects of the flourishing drug trade, along with the black markets, that undermines the economies of Iran and Pakistan, threatening their stability as well. In addition, several chapters deal with the competition of various oil and gas companies in the region. Most importantly, it outlines the struggle between the Argentinean Bridas and the US Unocal. The first trying to build a pipeline through Afghanistan in order to link its oil fields in Turkmenistan to Pakistan, and the second trying to outbid it (with the mercantilist support of the US government and under the advice of one Henry Kissinger). The confusing politics involved the US simultaneously promoting UNOCAL interests and hampering any project that would involve Iran. The Russians sabotaging any pipeline that would make the Central Asian states less dependent on Moscow or that would circumvent Russian participation.

The most consistent message of the book, however, is an indictment of Pakistani and US involvement in the region. Not so much seen as imperialist (contrary to many recent claims), their policies have suffered from chronic lack of vision. Without a coherent strategy for the future of Afghanistan, Washington has resorted to reactive policy, withdrawing when its support is badly needed or coming in strength for what some consider peripheral reasons (e.g. the hunt for Bin Laden before 2001). Rashid blames Clinton's weakness in constantly bowing to domestic politics on international issues (and he is right about that), and also blames the UN for not taking a stronger and united position on human rights issues (also right although not clear how it could have been achieved). Finally, Pakistan's inept handling of the Taliban is leading, according to Rashid, down the dangerous road of extremism that might lead to Talibanization of that country. Still, one must be cautious not to take too far statements like "those who intervene in Afghanistan can face disintegration themselves... because of forces that are unleashed in their own fragile societies" (p. 209). One wonders whether that weakness is not a clarion call for intervention.

An engaging and interesting book, Ahmed Rashid's account perhaps emphasizes too much the pernicious international influences. One would like to know why, for example, if "Taliban's interpretation of Islam is so negative and destructive" (p. 211), none of the Sunni countries censured it. Also, the claim that the US "woke up" to the problem only when feminists brought up the issue is doubtful because it accords too much influence on vocal women groups. It is also not clear that the US did in fact "wake up," at least not until after 9-11-01. The conclusion that one might draw from the book is that the Taliban, despite drawing their numbers from the largest ethnic group, are actually are minority of foreign-trained, obscurantist soldiers that have not endeared themselves to the majority of the Afghan population. The strict application of Sharia has plunged the country into social and economic disaster, from which many probably pray for deliverance. There is then hope for the US-British operations that may succeed in toppling the conservative Taliban leaders and encourage a settlement between the moderate elements in the movement and the various other groups.

October 21, 2001.

@book{rashid-01,
    title     = {Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia},
    author    = {Ahmed Rashid},
    year      = 2001,
    publisher = {Yale University Press},
    address   = {New Haven},
    isbn      = {0-300-08902-3 (pbk.)},
    notes     = {Chronology, Taliban structure, index, bibliography; Pp. 279}
}