Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat

Paul Kecskemeti

Stanford University Press, 1958; Pp: ix, 287

The author examines the concept of strategic surrender, that is, the rational ending of total wars with gradual mobilization of resources, where the final victory is brought about by a strategy of attrition. He argues that surrender, in which the loser trades his residual fighting capacity for better terms, and in which the winner offers a bargain to avoid paying the costs of the last battle, is properly seen as a decision, whose time comes when the divergent trend of attrition has become evident and irreversible. The actual offer and acceptance hinge upon the military situation and the expectations about the political outcome of capitulation.

Theory

From the strategic perspective, surrender occurs when "a military engagement or a war is terminated by an agreement under which active hostilities cease and control over the loser's remaining military capability is vested in the winner" (p. 5). Such victory can be accomplished either through disruption, in which the enemy's ability to resist is destroyed in pitch battle, or attrition. "Surrender means that winner and loser agree to dispense with a last round of fighting'' and is such a rational decision on both sides when a divergent trend of attrition becomes evident and irreversible. "What the loser avoids by offering to surrender is a last, chaotic round of fighting that would have the characteristics of a rout... [the winner] can obtain his objective without paying the costs of a last battle" (p. 8). Wars are then mechanisms through which the actual outcome "reveals itself only gradually" and thus neither side can avoid incurring some losses. Surrender is just a way to renounce the use of residual fighting capability.

Because strategic surrender (i.e. one that withdraws belligerent status from one side in a war) can be advantageous to both sides, it is also a political concept, influenced by "both the military rationale of avoiding superfluous losses and the participants' expectations about the political aftermath" (p. 15). The author examines surrender in "total wars" where he classifies war according to (i) the symmetry or asymmetry of the final outcome, (ii) the proportion of resources mobilized or destroyed in war, and (iii) the symmetry or asymmetry of the political outcome (pp. 17-8). Wars that are (a) total, (b) with progressive mobilization or resources, and (c) whose asymmetric outcome is incurred by attrition, must end in surrender (p. 21). "Decisions about ending or continuing wars may be said to depend on the belligerents' evaluation of their `political stake' and on their appraisal of military prospects and the cost of prolonged warfare. These factors are subject to re-evaluation as the war proceeds" (pp. 20-1, emphasis mine).

Case Studies

In the French surrender of 1940, both sides clearly appreciated the political advantages of concluding an armistice, which is why it was successful. The French government bargained its residual fighting capacity using the latent threat of retreating to Africa and waging the war from there, and could thus "disarm" the Germans, who avoided costly terminal operations. The Germans did not press the French on the matter of the fleet, which they clearly understood to have been a possible stumbling block, especially in view of British apprehension. Since the larger conflict did not end, the agreement was not permanent and both sides exploited it to promote their own objectives.

The Italian surrender of 1943, on the other hand, was confused and marred by opportunities lost to the Allies. Unlike the Germans, the victorious Allies adopted an unusually rigid policy of unconditional surrender and refused to negotiate with Badoglio and the King except on its terms. Although this did not seem to prolong Italian belligerency, it did make the Allies' fight in Italy harder because they could not avail themselves of friendly Italian units against the Germans, who moved quickly to disarm their former allies.

With Germany, the surrender of 1945 was strictly unconditional, and she could not "disarm" the allies. First, the power asymmetry at the end of the war was simply too great, but second, and most important, the Germans tried to bargain with the Western Allies hoping to use them against the Russians, whose advance they feared most. The Germans did not succeed in breaking up the allies because despite the latent revulsion against Communism, the West was not prepared to risk a breach with Stalin. Each side feared that the other might capture Germany for its own purposes, and thus a weak Germany was a mutually acceptable objective. The spontaneous surrender in the West, i.e. the piecemeal capitulations to British and American troops, however, enabled the Germans to continue fighting in the East and sucked in the Allies so that German units could surrender to them instead and population could flee from territories captured by the Soviets. This was a "small political dividend" even though it was never officially sanctioned by the allies.

The Japanese surrender of 1945 is a good illustration of the use of residual power to resist with tenacious will for obtaining political concessions. While the Japanese clung to the illusion of Soviet mediation, they would not negotiate with the Americans hoping for better terms through the offices of Moscow. Stalin may have deliberately encouraged this hope to gain time and enter the war against Japan and thus secure a voice in the division of the spoils. The Allies insistence on unconditional surrender further closed the channels of communication. When Stalin declared war, the only obstacle in front of the peace party in Tokyo remained the fate of the emperor. Once this request was granted at Potsdam (by omission), the Japanese surrendered.

The Policy of Unconditional Surrender

There are two "rules" of unconditionality: (i) no negotiation with the enemy except on details of capitulation, and (ii) no recognition of its political leadership following surrender. Although Germany was occupied before it surrendered (thus meeting the "vacuum" rule), Italy and Japan surrendered beforehand, and so strict unconditionality could not be applied. Although Japan was strategically defeated, the Allies preferred to avoid a costly invasion and granted their sole demand. Although the Italians did surrender unconditionally, strong German presence on the peninsula made Italian assistance preferable, and so the allies had to abandon the "vacuum" rule in order to employ the authority of the royal regime.

July 18, 2001. BLS

@BOOK{kecskemeti-58:surrender,
    TITLE     = {Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat},
    AUTHOR    = {Paul Kecskemeti},
    YEAR      = {1958},
    PUBLISHER = {Stanford University Press},
    ADDRESS   = {Stanford},
    ISBN      = {0-521-27376-5},
    NOTE      = {Pp. ix, 287; index, bibliography}
}