Shôkyûki: An Account of the Shôkyû War of 1221

Anonymous, ca. 13th century
Tr. by William H. McCullough

Monumenta Nipponica, 19(1-4), 1964; Pp. 89

Review © 2002 Branislav L. Slantchev

Although Yoritomo established the Kamakura bakufu, the troubled relations between the military and the Court did not settle immediately. In fact, as Sansom notes, "The most difficult problem of the Bakufu after Yoritomo's death was to find a satisfactory Shôgun as a figurehead in whose name the Regent could govern. This was a point of weakness of which the Throne did not fail to take advantage" (p. 376).

Go-Toba had abdicated in 1198 and although he balanced the relations between Kyoto and Kamakura through Sanetomo. However, by 1213, Hôjô Yoshitoki, the new Regent, had come to rule in Kamakura and the rift between the Imperial House, which was trying to challenge the military's supremacy, and the Bakufu became open, and, following Sanetomo's assassination in 1219, irreversible. The present chronicle deals with the three-months war in 1221 that cemented the military rule by securing the defeat of the rebellious emperor and his banishment to Oki.

After a brief and boring introduction that narrates a semi-fictitious account of all disturbances in the history of Japan that have involved imperial personages, the chronicle plunges into the immediate causes of the war, which are almost unbelievably prosaic given that the war cost the lives of something like 15 thousand people: Go-Toba wanted to give some manors that belong to Kamakura vassals to one of his mistresses. He was rebuked by the Regent quite mildly given the serious challenge of the feudal structure that this request represented.

Even this was too much for Go-Toba, who was apparently looking for a convenient excuse to assert his power in the land, and so quickly the call to arms went out and loyalist supporters gathered in the capital. Although several of his advisers argued against military action, the cloistered emperor thought that in alliance with the monks, the Western lords could take on the Easterners from the Kânto. And so, in June 1221, the Court denounced Yoshitoki and declared eastern Japan in a state of rebelion.

The Kamakura reaction was swift and efficient: Yoshitoki sent three armies (numbering, we are told 190,000 troops against fewer than 20,000 on the other side; doubtless a wild exaggeration) along the three main roads to converge upon Kyoto. The quickly assembled loyalist forces were no match for the experienced eastern warriors and soon the fighting turned into a complete rout. It is characteristic of the severe disbalance of power that the chronicle tells of most loyalist warriors taking to flight instead of fighting to the end, as was the custom and as the military code demanded.

In the end, the Bakufu army occupied Kyoto, the supremacy of the Kamakura lords was established, a new emperor was installed, Go-Toba was banished to Oki, along with most of the senior nobles, and many of their followers were executed. Thus ended the Shôkyû Disturbance (sometimes alternatively called the Jôkyû Disturbance), and its repercussions were wide-ranging. The bakufu's relatively effortless victory had demonstrated its unchallengeable military might and the hopelessness of any overt political ventures against it. The bakufu also lost no time in confiscating the challengers' estates and distributing them among its loyal supporters, further strengthening the feudal ties to their new regime.

This was crucial because, as the chronicle makes abundantly clear, the rough warriors had to be frequently induced to fight by rather down to earth pecuniary promises. For example, when Takeda and Ogasawara converse in Mino Province, Takeda is made to say, "Listen! Here's the truth of the matter. If Kamakura is victorious, we'll adhere to Kamakura, and if Kyoto is victorious, we'll adhere to Kyoto. Such is the way of those who wield the bow and arrow!" A little later the commander of the bakufu Tôkaidô army Tokifusa has to promise them six provinces to induce them to make the required crossings that they had been previously assigned (pp. 428-29).

As literature, Shôkyûki is a rather dull reading. It is fairly linear and unimaginative, and there are many portions that are nothing more than lists of names. Although doubtless of historical interest, there is not much to recommend it as entertainment or even as didactic work. The bloody battles are dryly depicted as encounters of mostly anonymous armies, with nothing of the dash and individual vignettes present in the other war tales. Even the tragic aftermath of the failed rebelion is cursory and, with the exception of the rather pitiful death of Seitaka at the hands of his cruel uncle, unmemorable.

Written from Kyoto's perspective, the chronicle indulges way too much in describing the distressed state of various courtiers. In the end, they all come across as whiny and unworthy challengers of the military. When one thinks about it, the courtiers' fate of banishment must have been much easier than that of their followers, whose heads were displayed in various parts of the country after being detached from their bodies. To read the lamenting poems of the courtiers who bemoan their lot in life is quite repulsive, although I doubt that the author of the chronicle had exactly this effect in mind.

December 31, 2002

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@article{mccullough-shokyuki,
    title={Shokyuki: An Account of the Shokyu War of 1221},
    author={William H. McCullough},
    year=1964,
    journal={Monumenta Nipponica},
    volume=19,
    number={1-4},
    pages={163-215,420-455},
}