The Origins of the Second World War

A.J.P. Taylor

New York: Touchstone, 1961; Pages: 296

Why did not the Great Powers resist Germany? Great Britain's and France's dithering between resistance and appeasement made the war more likely (p. 9ff). American policy did no better. Hitler did not aim at general war and wanted the fruits of total victory without one. Germany's rearmament was largely a myth until 1936 (p. 21ff) and Germany remained a "peacetime" war economy until after British bombing of cities (not even after Stalingrad). The aftermath of Versailles left the German problem intact: with Russia out of the balance, a united Germany would come to dominate Europe. Structural conditions conducive to revisionism; Hitler embodied general trends, was more risk-acceptant and gambled without clear plans of what he could gain. Hesitation by France and Britain encouraged him too much and led him to miscalculation in 1939, when he expected another Munich over Danzig. The Soviets were forced into the Nonaggression Pact with Germany by Britain's failure to understand their security concerns. The war of 1939 was directly caused by Polish unwillingness to negotiate or allow the USSR to help, and British public opinion made it difficult to force conciliation on them.

Summary of Arguments and Subsidiary Points

The preface to American readers has a scathing indictment of Roosevelt's policy. The introduction defends the work and answers allegations of revisionism and "vindication" of Hitler. Hitler did not aim at general war, did not have a plan for one, managed to exploit the wavering of the allies, and almost got away with it (p. 19ff). The First World War was fought to decide the makeup of Europe, the Second -- to see if it continue (p. 19). The First fought for victory without war aims; had two victories: Germany over Russia, which caused Russia to fall out of European Balance of Power (p. 34), and Allies over Germany, which did not eliminate German problem because it left the country united (p. 24). The problem with reparations separated France from Britain and the US, left Germany aggrieved (for symbolical reasons), and encouraged repudiation of Versailles (p. 47). Occupation of the Ruhr showed that security could only be gained by winning the Germans, not threatening them (p. 50).

The Geneva-Locarno system suffered from absence of US and USSR but even more from presence of Italy and its pretense at balancing (p. 56). Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 led to League of Nations' action, which limited the conflict and brought it (unsatisfactorily) to and end; also increased its coercive powers by setting up the machinery of sanctions later used against Italy (p. 64). Failure of the Disarmament conference in 1932: French anxiety, British reluctance; Germany withdraws from the Conference and the League (p. 66). Hitler comes to power through constitutional means, with no plans for redesigning the system (p. 68). He never confronts other Powers directly, prefers to wait and let them wreck their opposition to his gains (p. 71). Problem is Great Powers don't know how to react to him building a strong Germany: preventive war or inaction; allies assumed they had a lot of time, which they did not (pp. 72--7). Gathering at Stresa first feeble attempt to stop Hitler, but after Saar plebiscite, he repudiates the disarmament clauses of Versailles (p. 85).

Italy resolves on conquering Abyssinia, Eden meets with Mussolini without success (p. 90); the League imposes sanctions on Italy but is surprised by their quick victory. Hoare-Laval Plan for compromise brings down both governments in France and Britain; complete failure of the League, killed by publication of the sensible Plan which, however, required demonstration of principle, not interest (pp. 94--6). As a result, Hitler decides to test his luck and occupies the Rhineland on 7 March, 1936; prevalent European opinion is that Germany is right; feeble attempts at diplomacy (pp. 97--100). The end of Locarno was a turning point because now Germany had an army and therefore it was possible to coerce it by traditional means -- by war; she lost her "priceless asset" of confronting democratic countries with an impossible dilemma of not having an army to defeat. Thus, rather than being the last chance of stopping Germany by peaceful means, the occupation of the Rhineland gave the means of opposing her for the first time (p. 101).

International anarchy cannot be blamed for war in itself (p. 102); wickedness of Fascism, economic reasons, capitalist conflict, even revisionism and Lebensraum are insufficient (pp. 103--6). The Treaty of Versailles provided Hitler with policy; its repudiation left him without grievances (p. 109). Both the Axis (with Italy) and the Anti-Comintern Pact (with Japan) stressed ideological similarity and shied from practical terms (p. 111); both the French and the British were ambivalent toward Fascism, which many preferred to Communism (p. 112). Belgian withdrawal from French alliance into neutrality was a huge strategic blow to France's defense system; still they failed to arm for reasons of domestic reform (p. 115); and the British failed to arm for adherence to economic principle of stern fiscal policy (p. 118); military armaments depend on objective, more for offense, less for defense, but never aim at parity (p. 115). During the Spanish Civil War only Franco received aid from Italy (some from Hitler), the republicans got some from USSR, but nothing from the West, which doomed them (pp. 121--6). Problems in the Far East (Japan's war with China) worsened Britain's relations with Japan, and increased Soviet desire not to get involved in Europe (pp. 129--30).

The Hossbach memorandum was a maneuver in domestic affairs; does not reveal Hitler's plans for aggression, but his desire to win conservatives over for his dismissal of Schacht over disagreements about further armaments (pp. 131--4). Halifax leaves Hitler with impression that Britain would not oppose peaceful revisionism in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig (p. 137). The first step toward the Anschluss came from Schuschnigg when he asked for a meeting with Hitler; the agreement of 12 February 1938 set the way for the "evolutionary solution" and got only Hitler's repudiation of Austrian Nazi actions (p. 142); provided Hitler with something to help Reichstag swallow wholesale dismissal of conservative anti-Nazis in German government (p. 143). Schuschnigg has second thoughts and declares intentions for plebiscite, Austria is entirely abandoned by all Western Powers; Germany hesitates to the last, the invasion is improvised and the Anschluss of 13 March is forced on Hitler who would have preferred democratic means of achieving it (pp. 146--8). Germany has gotten away with murder but has lost the asset of aggrieved morality and has appeared as conqueror (p. 149).

Problem with Czechoslovakia was its multinational character; Hitler exploited the Sudenten movement (p. 154). Britain and France abandoned Benes with excuse that they were unable to defend the Czechs, determined to extract concessions from Benes, not to restrain Germany (pp. 160-1; the Russians (may have been bluffing) were denied passage through Poland or Romania (p. 163). Britain convinced that Hitler had a deadline, alarmed at Czech show of resistance on May 21, 1938; France threatens to renege on its alliance with the Czechs. Lord Runciman goes to "mediate" and Benes outmaneuvers him and the Sudetens through brilliant diplomacy: he concedes everything that was asked of him; this swings British public opinion into supporting the Czech side (pp. 169--70). The question became not "are the German claims justified," but "are we strong enough to resist Hitler" (a negative answer to that explains why Chamberlain was welcomed as a bringer of peace after Munich). On September 21, France delivers ultimatum to Benes and the Czechs accept Anglo-French proposals, at Munich Hitler was able to appear conciliatory, the Czechs were not allowed at the meeting and were forced to accept the decision with an ultimatum (Sep 29). The rump Czech state quickly disintegrated with Slovakia declaring independence and Bohemia becoming a German protectorate on March 15, 1939 (p. 202). British public opinion hardens, appeasers start losing ground, after German occupation of Prague, even Chamberlain starts questioning Hitler's policies (pp. 204--5); further aggravated by German annexation of Memel (March 23), a sign of what might happen to Danzig (p. 209) and on March 30, Britain commits to Poland (p. 211).

Hitler's objective is alliance with Poland, not its destruction (p. 210) and Beck's obstinacy prevented a resolution over Danzig (predominantly German). The war of 1939 was far from premeditated, it was a mistake, a result on both sides of diplomatic blunders (p. 219). German claims there better justified than in Czechoslovakia or Austria, wanted to settle through negotiations, Poland answered by force; war of nerves began; Hitler waited for British decision (p. 220). Britain fails to see need for alliance with USSR (p. 226); Soviets want to be left out of Europe and are eager to conclude one (p 230); Britain delays negotiations repeatedly (p. 231), Soviets leak info to press to influence public opinion without much effect (p. 232); France supports USSR in the negotiations (p. 239), but they fall through anyway on August 17, when France and Britain were unable to allow the Red Army to march through Poland in its defense (pp. 240, 256). On August 14, German telegram makes overt approach to the Russians, Molotov suddenly reverses reluctant attitude on August 18 (p. 260); personal correspondence between Hitler and Stalin; nonaggression pact signed on August 23. France lapses into inaction, Britain frantically tries to negotiate with Germany and attempts to find ways to make Beck conciliatory; to no avail (p. 270). Polish obstinacy combined with Britain locked by its alliance and public opinion dragged France into the war (pp. 277--8).

Subjects with Factual Information

Hossbach memorandum and the supposed revelation of Hitler's war plans (pp. 22ff, 181). The timing of the last days before the attack on Poland (pp. 270--8).

Historiographical Observations

Diplomatic history. No introduction to chapters, but usually some form of conclusion at the end (last couple of sentences). Taylor is working hard to show that Hitler (and others) reacted to events and exploited opportunities more than had any coherent plan of action.

Bibliographical Notes

Short annotated bibliography, lists works in German, French, and Italian; both primary and secondary sources. Two hand-drawn maps of no great use. Index (brief) and footnotes.

March 2, 2001. BLS

@BOOK{taylor-61:origins,
    TITLE     = {The Origins of the Second World War},
    AUTHOR    = {{A. J. P.} Taylor},
    YEAR      = {1961},
    PUBLISHER = {Touchstone},
    ADDRESS   = {New York},
    ISBN      = {0-684-82947-9},
    NOTE      = {Pp. 296}
}