An Introduction to Existentialism

Robert G. Olson

New York: Dover, 1962; Pages: 221

Existentialism is perhaps the most modern movement in philosophy, and with representatives like Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus, Kafka, and Unamuno, has had a profound impact on contemporary thought, literature, and art. This influence is enough to make one wonder about the movement, which, despite its practitioners' insistence on clear thinking, remains somewhat impenetrable to the casual reader. Prof. Olson's book is introductory in the sense that it does not presuppose familiarity with philosophy beyond what most of us would have from high school and college. Unlike other intro books, however, this one is not condescending, does not avoid problems with reasoning, and is remarkably honest as it is deep. Without doubt, this is the most concise, lucid, and useful exposition of existentialism I have seen.

The first commendable feature of Olson's book is its superb organization and structuring of the argument. The author does not shy from philosophic jargon but all terminology is clearly explained in non-technical terms. In placing existentialism in the context of philosophy's efforts to resolve the basic contradictions of physical and spiritual existence, Olson provides an account of other movements, starting with the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel. Some of these writers are not exactly the easiest to read, and many of the commentaries on their work is also insight-free, which is why Olson's clear explanations are so useful.

The book is divided in seven chapters, each dealing with a particular question that arises from the discussion. The first, and most general, is about value orientation. For Olson, despite the many faces of philosophy, its practitioners have been remarkably uniform in their insistence that the pursuit of pleasure, fame, and wealth leads to a life of frustration, insecurity, and pain (p.4). The author then outlines several ways philosophers have tried to escape this existence: (i) Stoics, through the renouncement of desire, and concentration on exercise of dignified will; (ii) Enlightenment, with the belief that man can mold his environment through a concerted and rational effort; (iii) mystics-religious thought, which redirect desire toward an eternal object. The existentialist begin by rejecting the notion of a complete and satisfying life and charge both the ordinary man and philosophers with inhumanity. "Man could not become happy without ceasing to be man" (p.15). The basic values derived from this position are three: (i) acceptance of anguish and suffering; (ii) liberation from anxiety, fear, or apathy; and (iii) arousal of consciousness and commitment to an energetic course of action (p.18).

To "prove" their case, existentialists have recourse to two types of argument: they can either show that the traditional values are impossible to achieve, or show that even if they could be achieved, it would entail the sacrifice of more important values. According to Olson, the stronger attack occurs on that second front. To this end, existentialists enumerate several superior values, freedom of choice being the premier among them (p.21-2). This is where we run into the first problems because it seems that what existentialists mean by "freedom" is man's ability exercise arbitrary choice, that is, choices that are context and institution-free. However, man, as a rational animal, operates in a context he cannot escape, and all his choices (when he makes them) are contingent upon his evaluation of that environment. Different people placed in similar environments may, in fact, behave similarly. I do not know that we can call them unfree. Individual behavior may not be predictable, but mass behavior generally is.

The next step of existentialists is to show that man is doomed to unhappiness, which they do by intuition (i.e. there is no proof, but a mere assertion) and end up being totally unconvincing. It is certainly not self-evident to me that "consciousness is inevitably unhappy consciousness" (p.25). The other contention that "intensely lived experiences... are the chief of human values" is a value judgment, and as such has to deal with the usual strong Anglo-American criticism that even though one can tell what men desire, one can never tell what men ought to desire. In fact, the entire existentialist claim rests upon the assumption that the human condition is the same for all individuals, a very doubtful proposition (p.28-9).

The next chapter is then dedicated to the human condition, which forms the basis of all existentialist thought, and is characterized by three types of anguish: that of being, that of before the here and now, and that of freedom. The anguish of being is "the feeling we have... whenever we ask ourselves how it is that there is something rather than nothing" (p.31). Usually, we end up acknowledging the absurdity of existence, that is, the fact that this question defies our understanding. But once the radical contingency, or absurdity, is revealed, we face the "ultimate meaninglessness of both man and the world" (p.37). All this is true and fine, but it is not clear that it should be a source of anguish---it certainly is not for me, as I am more likely to side with Nietzsche here in exalting Man as the only source of human dignity.

The anguish before the here and now is the anguish of human particularity, that is, the simple fact that we exist at a particular point in time and space, which we cannot transcend (because there is no ultimate goal or supreme existence). The charges leveled against humanists and philosophers who envision things sub specie aeternitatis are valid (p.44-50). However, one is again at a loss to see why the realization of particularity should be a source of anguish and not, say, pride.

Finally, the anguish of freedom, or "the anguish over the fact that one must choose" (p.51). There are two weak points here: first, I don't believe that men always choose what to do, in fact, it seems that much of their existence is directed at establishing patterns of behavior so that they can cruise on autopilot, without giving second thought to their actions. Second, I don't see why choice must be a source of anguish. If one believes in the ultimate meaninglessness of existence, then no choice is of consequence or importance. If no choice is of consequence, then no choice can possibly cause anguish. That is, the realization that I could just as well be doing anything else is liberating---this is precisely how I chose to go to grad school. On the bright side, this section of the chapter is the best exposition on the being "in-itself" and the being "of-itself", and their interaction (or lack of it). Existentialists assert that man "wants to be an in-itself-for-itself without duality" (p.58), which, of course, is impossible, and hence, source of anguish. Accepting this assertion, however, requires another leap of faith, as any discussion that posits that things have two separate existence modes: by themselves (i.e. Ideas, noumena, in-itself), and as conceived by man (physical, phenomena, for-itself). This duality can be hard to swallow, and even if it is swallowed, I am still unpersuaded that man is doomed to trying to unite them.

March 2, 2001. BLS

@BOOK{olson-62:existentialism,
    TITLE     = {An Introduction to Existentialism},
    AUTHOR    = {Robert G. Olson},
    YEAR      = {1962},
    PUBLISHER = {Dover},
    ADDRESS   = {New York},
    ISBN      = {0-486-20055-8},
    NOTE      = {Pp. 221}
}