Every War Must End

Fred Charles Iklé

Columbia University Press, 1971; Pages: 160

The field of international relations is saturated with books and articles that deal with the causes of war. Remarkably, there have been very few works that analyze the question of war termination. It is perhaps surprising that scholars have paid so little attention to this, especially when one considers the possibility that expectations about the war outcome enter into prewar decision calculus. Iklé's book is one of the first attempts to fill this gap. The most distressing message in EVERY WAR MUST END is that often policymakers have not the slightest idea about their war aims, how they can be brought about, or how to end the war. In many ways, it appears that starting a war is easier than ending it.

Some of the factors that the author considers include military estimates, conflict escalation, and domestic politics. Throughout the entire book, the emphasis is on uncertainty, and although this is by no means novel, the extent to which incomplete information combines with cognitive biases and misperception may be surprising, if not alarming. The nebulous nature of military estimates has been known for a long time. There is difficulty in choosing between several available estimates, and it is notoriously hard to calculate the potential of the adversary. Perhaps more egregious are errors in estimating enemy reactions, especially when it has to do with escalation of hostilities. The author uses the fateful German decision to launch unrestricted submarine warfare as the leading example. Despite the minute detail that went into the report prepared for the General Staff, the analysts assumed that Britain would fall within five months and then analyzed the effect of US entry based on that assumption. Clearly this approach neglected the fact that British behavior would be influenced by the expected US entry, making capitulation a remote possibility. Sometimes, however, the threat to escalate the conflict may bring about the conclusion of peace (the author cites the Russo-Finnish Winter War, but it is doubtful to what extent Stalin was influenced by the highly noncredible Finnish threat to involve France and Britain, and to what extent Stalin was accommodating Hitler's alarm).

The chapter on domestic politics is especially interesting. Everyone talks about "hawks" and "doves" when it comes to international relations, and it is usually the "doves" that have to bear the burden of nonpatriotism. The author, however, shows two brands of betrayal: the traitors, who sabotage the war effort of their own country to the benefit of a foreign force, and the adventurists, who sabotage the interests of their own country by involving it further in war. Depending on circumstances, "hawks" can be worse than the "doves". Although mentioned in passing, the curious behavior of liberal democracies during war (and the suppression of pacifists) should be investigated further. The penultimate chapter expands on the domestic politics idea and discusses the search for exit options, especially when ending the war might mean the end of some faction that is in power during the war. The last chapter is not terribly useful because it deals with nuclear deterrence (on a fairly superficial level).

The book certainly makes an interesting and worthwhile read, and as a first cut is essential. However, it is poorly organized and the wealth of ideas is hidden in an often rambling prose. Some of the historical examples are not without controversy too. This work is a good starting point for serious IR scholars who want to pay more attention to the processes that lead to conclusion of hostilities. It is unsettling to think that we may be on very thin ice here.

May 10, 2001. BLS

@BOOK{ikle-71:war,
    TITLE     = {Every War Must End},
    AUTHOR    = {Fred Charles Ikl\'{e}},
    YEAR      = {1971},
    PUBLISHER = {Columbia University Press},
    ADDRESS   = {New York},
    ISBN      = {0-231-08647-4},
    NOTE      = {Pp. viii, 160}
}