Cleansing: Why Did Stalin Decapitate His Army?

Viktor Suvorov (Translated by Ivan Totomanov)

Sofia: Fakel Express, 1999; Pages: 319

Another controversial (which of what Suvorov writes isn't) assessment of the political purges of the Red Army in 1936-8. Following his customary line of glorifying the military might of the Soviet military, the genius of its High Command, and the tragic heroism of the Russian people, Suvorov claims that the bloody repression that claimed the lives of 40,000 people was all for the good and for the better.

Point one. The majority of those purged were, in fact, not military personnel at all. Because everyone important in the militarized state carried military ranks, simply enumerating the generals, commanders, etc. who were killed leaves one with the incorrect impression that the army was beheaded. Most of those "tried and executed" were political functionaires, members of NKVD, GPU, or other organizations whose only purpose was controlling the civilians and the party discipline through bloody terror. Most of those deserved to die anyway and their removal did not hurt the army.

Point two. The so-called geniuses of strategic thought mindlessly killed off by Stalin (thus crippling the Red Army on the eve of its major challenge) were, in fact, bloodthirsty cretins, stupid careerists, and debauched drunks. Suvorov provides several examples, but the most dramatic is the systematic debunking of the Tukhachevsky, Dibenko, and Yakir myths. Excellent reading.

Point three. The new blood that came to command the army after the purges was talented, experienced, and dedicated. Again, he gives several well-chosen examples. He also dispels the myth of lack of experience in the Soviet high command by showing that most commanders had several years of military training and combat experience that their Nazi counterparts lacked.

Point four. Stalin was not afraid of Hitler but clearly did not anticipate the Nazi attack. Why? Because only an utter idiot would attack the USSR under the circumstances Germany wound up in after 1939. Of course, no genius can predict what a lunatic would do, which is why Stalin dismissed all warnings. Tenuous? Perhaps. But intriguing. Actually, the German attack makes (some) logical sense in light of Suvorov's other argument---that Stalin was preparing the "liberation" of Europe. Here, Hitler's Barbarossa is simply a desperate attempt to forestall the inevitable. Unfortunately, most Nazi documents that I am aware of do not support such interpretation because they are all filled with self-assured smug conviction of quick victory. So the other interpretation stands: idiots.

This book is a recommended reading along with all other Suvorov writings on the subject. He might have exaggerated to prove his point, but his claims should not be ignored. We might have to overcome the Khrushchev propaganda (which unfortunately still has all Western analysts in its grip) and face the grim possibility that (i) Stalin's brutal socialism was actually the humane version compared to what Trotsky & co. advocated; (ii) that his inhuman collectivization with the deliberately induced famine in the Ukraine which killed millions was (in his view) the only way to support the rapid industrialization of the country necessary to build the enormous military machine required for his plans; (iii) that he did have plans to destroy the capitalist West (and North, and South, and East, and everything in between), and (iv) that we would have succeeded if it weren't for the suicidal attack of the Germans. Hitler saved the world from Stalin. Unpalatable, yes. Possible? Perhaps.

October 11, 2000. BLS

@BOOK{suvorov-99:cleansing,
    TITLE     = {Ochishtenie: zashto Stalin obezglavi armiata si?},
    AUTHOR    = {Viktor Suvorov},
    YEAR      = {1999},
    PUBLISHER = {Fakel Express},
    ADDRESS   = {Sofia},
    ISBN      = {954-9772-01-2},
    NOTE      = {Pp. 319, translated by Ivan Totomanov}
}