The Causes of War

Geoffrey Blainey

New York: The Free Press, 1988, 3rd edition; Pages: 325

This is perhaps one of the most frequently cited book in the scholarly literature on the causes of war, with authors either using Blainey's arguments in support of their own theses or arguing against them. The author's main contention is that ``[w]ars usually begin when two nations disagree on their relative strength, and wars usually cease when the fighting nations agree on their relative strength. Agreement or disagreement emerges from the shuffling of the same set of factors. Thus each factor is capable of promoting war or peace... When nations prepare to fight one another, they have contradictory expectations of the likely duration and outcome of war. When those predictions, however, cease to be contradictory, the war is almost certain to end" (pp. 293-4).

The Causes of Peace

The author contends (with good reason) that we really do not know what causes peace. He outlines and debunks several common explanations:

war-weariness (Richardson, Toynbee): finds very little evidence, argues that if there is an effect, it is weak and does not last for long beyond the last war
economic pursuits deflect from war: this is most evidently wrong
revolutions are substitutes for war (Thompson): many wars actually sprang from civil strife
powerful statesmen: cannot do anything unless the environment is permissive
ideas (Nef): despite the enthusiasm in Europe and the belief that no war will be fought between civilized nations, we saw two world wars in this century; interestingly, this theory has also found a more recent exposition in John Mueller's RETREAT FROM DOOMSDAY, where he argues that civilized nations have forsaken war as a policy instrument because they (supposedly) do not even consider fighting as a means of resolving conflicts
moderate peace terms: little evidence of this, Blainey argues that most stable and peaceful periods followed the decisive defeat of some country and a harsh treaty imposed by the victorious state (as a side note, Versailles, universally maligned as a cause of World War II, is actually blameless, if one is to believe J. M. Keynes)
liberalism: free trade, democracy, the free flow of ideas, etc. will lead to peace; there is an entire chapter (2) that debunk this. Of course, the naive version of liberalism has had a hard time anyway (see, for example E.H. Carr's 20 YEARS' CRISIS), but it is not clear that some form of it does not contain a tenable explanation for peace, as the modern prevalence of institutionalism (neo-liberalism) in academia can attest. Of course, many seem to neglect the simple fact that the benign developments of the last half century (at least in the Western hemisphere) have taken place in the shadow of complete military and economic dominance of the US, so we may be witnessing simply a Pax Americana, which may not survive the hegemon supporting it. (Happily, there's no sign of this happening any time soon, rumors of American decline being greatly exaggerated.)

The Causes of War

The optimism with which leaders begin wars: everyone believes war will be short and they will win it (non-rationalist). Noting Tuchman's analysis of the outbreak of the First World War, Blainey notes that while optimism about the duration of war can be explained (limited nature of recent wars, financial and commercial dependence), the simultaneous beliefs about victory are contradictory but cannot be explained rationally. Rival expectations due to "relative assessments of each other's ability to attract allies, their ability to finance the war, their internal stability and national morale, their qualities of civilian leadership and their performance in recent wars" (p. 54). The problem is not only that each state attaches different weights to each factor, but that even if they used the same formula, they still would draw different conclusions, which is untenable in a strict rationalist framework (Aumann 1975, Harsanyi 1969). War ends when beliefs about the likely outcome converge: "...at the end of a war those rival expectations, initially so far apart, are so close to one another that terms of peace can be agreed upon" (p. 56).
The expectations about behavior of third parties: opportunism and restraint. Predictions about how others will react to possible war always part and parcel of the decision to fight (p. 57). This can go either war: if third parties are expected to be restrained, an aggressor might go for the prize; on the other hand, a probable intervention may cause forbearance.
Internal strife or dramatic change (e.g. death of monarch). Debunks (very well) the diversionary "theory" of war by noting that in every historical case internal strife and disunity had deterrent effects and did not provoke war. On the other hand, there is a strong relationship between domestic instability (revolution, death of monarch) and war. The reason, according to Blainey, is opportunism by outside parties when internal developments muddy previously well-known power calculations (p. 82). In essence, war is caused by the perception that a state is temporarily weakened and will not be able to respond to challenge. Most of these cases usually involve great optimism by the attacker.
Economic causes. It is not depression that causes war, but periods of economic recovery and relative prosperity, usually because they foster inordinate optimism (p. 91), but also affect the revenues and expenditure of governments. In periods of decline or depressions, "the mood of governments tends to be cautious or apprehensive" (p. 93).
Seasonal factors. Wars are usually fought in the spring or in the summer. Though not really a cause of war, the seasons are an influence because "anything which increases leaders' beliefs that they can forcibly impose their will on an enemy, and anything which increases the desire to impose their will, should be called a cause of war" (p. 104).
Measuring relative strength. "...warfare is the one convincing way of measuring the distribution of power. The end of a war produces a neat ledger of power which has been duly audited and signed. According to that ledger an agreed preponderance of power tends to foster peace... one can almost suggest that war is usually the outcome of a diplomatic crisis which cannot be resolved because both sides have conflicting estimates of their bargaining power... In essence the very factor which made the enemies reluctant to continue fighting also persuaded them to negotiate. That factor was their agreement about their relative bargaining position" (pp. 113-4, 118, 122, emphasis mine).

Common Fallacies of Explanations for War

Accidental wars. Argues that wars never start unintentionally and probably only rarely by accident. The only thing unintentional is the outcome of fighting since wars sometimes end with the defeat with "at least one nation which had expected victory" (p. 145).
Ambitions and war aims. "[War] aims are simply varieties of power. The vanity of nationalism, the will to spread an ideology, the protection of kinsmen in an adjacent land, the desire for more territory or commerce, the avenging of a defeat or insult, the craving for greater national strength or independence, the wish to impress or cement alliances --- al these represent power in different wrappings. The conflicting aims of rival nations are always conflicts of power... It is dangerous to accept any explanation of war which concentrates on ambitions and ignores the means of carrying out those ambitions. A government's aims are strongly influenced by its assessment of whether it has sufficient strength to achieve these aims" (pp. 149-50, 151, emphasis mine).
Surprise attacks. Argues that "the day that lives in infamy" only does so because the Japanese attack was so successful. However, the attack without declaration of war was, in fact, part of a long tradition of war (p. 170). "Opportunism, and the veiled or open use of force, pervade every phase of the sequence of war and peace" (p. 173).

Varieties of War

Recurrent wars. The essence of these wars is "the inability of one side to defeat the other decisively" (p. 183). Gives the series of Russo-Turkish wars as an example, but there are many others, which today go under the title "enduring rivalries."
Long wars. These coincide with "a period when the defence was in the ascendant" (p. 187). However, Blainey emphasizes not technology, but the scope: "The long wars between 1700 and 1815 were general wars in which many nations participated... the only general war in the northern hemisphere during the ninety-nine years from the defeat of Napoleon to the start of the First World War was the Crimean War: significantly it was the longest European war in the period" (p. 196). Why are general wars longer: (i) military strength more likely to be evenly distributed between the two sides; (ii) fighting occurs on several fronts and it is unlikely that one side is winning everywhere; (iii) war alliances do not usually coordinate campaigns efficiently; (iv) with everyone involved, there is no fear that a third party would come in unexpectedly, a factor which shortens wars between two sides (p. 197). Also, colonial wars tend to be long because the conquering nation is unable to use its military might against the specific techniques used by the indigents.
Short wars. All wars in Europe during the 19th century (after 1815) were short. This was widely attributed to (i) new war technology and means of transport, and (ii) scarcity of gold and credit. Blainey argues that these are mistaken and they were proven so by the outbreak of the First World War, and its stalemated fighting (at least on the Western front). "In the last century and a half those short wars, which seemed most dramatically to proclaim the value of mechanised methods, were shortened only in part by new techniques of warfare. Thus the Seven Weeks War of 1866 was ended quickly, less by the decisive battle of Sadowa than by the realisation of each side that if they continued the war other powers might intervene and so worsen their position" (p. 227).
Wide wars. Blainey observes that "a war was more likely to widen if it began near the hub of Europe and first involved at least one major European power" (p. 232). He notices that these wars begin as simple wars between two nations and others gradually get drawn in. Each such entry is a beginning of a new war. "A general war is a series of wars happening simultaneously and entangled with one another... The spread of ... war to other countries was the result of the same kind of conditions which began the war. For the fighting often raised issues vital to countries which were adjacent but aloof: it endangered their independence or it offered an opportunity to increase their independence. Decisive fighting in the early phase of some wars not only raised issues that were vital to adjacent nations but it led to contradictory perceptions of military power" (p. 241).

Others

There is a chapter on Australia's role in the Pacific War, where Blainey argues that his country was neither a reluctant nor a voiceless ally of Britain, but an active participant, whose behavior provoked the Japanese just as much as the economic blockade enforced by the British and the Americans. Concludes that the military vulnerability of Singapore and the other European colonies tempted the Japanese, who were pressed hard by the blockade and were aided by their enemy's consistent (probably racist) underestimation of Japanese military power.

The next chapter is on the effect of nuclear weapons. Blainey argues that it is not clear whether nuclear weapons produced peace (most likely they did not for there have been long periods of peace in the 19th century), but they are probably useful in keeping the peace going. The "balance of terror" is a misnomer because the role that he envisions for nukes has little to do with their actual use. Indeed possession is seen as a pacifier. However, if nations are not likely to use them (like they did not use gas or biological warfare after the First Word War even though they could), then it is not clear that nuclear weapons have a deterrent effect. The only restraining influence seems to be for cases where a nuclear powers is engaged in a conventional war and is losing it with grave danger for its position. Then nukes might (or might not) be used. Blainey picks an argument with people like Gaddis, who think that nuclear weapons are necessary for the long peace, and Mueller, who thinks they are irrelevant because Western nations have abandoned war as means of resolving disputes (here one should mention that there are other nations in the world, also with nuclear capabilities, that do not seem to be so "civilized").

July 3, 2001. BLS

@BOOK{blainey-88:causes,
    TITLE     = {The Causes of War},
    EDITION   = {3rd},
    AUTHOR    = {Geoffrey Blainey},
    YEAR      = {1988},
    PUBLISHER = {The Free Press},
    ADDRESS   = {New York},
    ISBN      = {0-02-903591-0 (pbk.);},
    NOTE      = {Pp. 325, bibliography, index}
}