War in International Society: A Study in International Sociology
Even Luard
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987; Pages: 468

An empirical, historically oriented, sociological study of war. Luard defines as war
any conflict, in which there is "a substantial measure of organisation on both
sides," a "significant degree of fighting," and which is "sustained over a significant
period" (p. 6). The list is thus much longer than Small-Singer's but shorter than
Richardson's.


The Scientific Study of War

(Note that by "scientific" Luard really means "statistical" and mostly excludes the
currently popular deductive modelling. Since one may, as I would, take issue with
the atheoretical regression-blender "proofs", the following should be treated as
criticisms of the Michigan approach.) Luard enumerates (rightly) problems with method
and its application:

    

  1. initial selection of wars (the restrictive COW criteria are well known);

  2. accurate knowledge of facts --- very important since statistical tests require
that the data is correct;

  3. do we treat a multilateral war as one big war or a series of small bilateral wars?;

  4. interpretation of facts (e.g. who is the initiator, arbitrary in COW);

  5. assessment of relative power of states is notoriously difficult and suspect;

  6. bias toward quantifiable phenomena at the expense of (equally, if not more
important) factors that are not measurable.


Luard concludes that his systematic comparative approach is superior (p. 12).


Levels of Analysis

Luard proposes to combine state and international levels. He disagrees with Waltz that
states are like units because he detects varying "propensities of states to war" and
argues that "nations, even of a similar power, have varied greatly in their willingness
to make war, or even to prepare for war, according to their level of satisfaction with
the status quo" (pp. 13-4). In addition, the "same state may vary greatly
in propensity to war in different periods." 

Remark. These are both doubtful. In the first case, satisfaction is not a state
attribute but a reflection of its position in the international system and the benefits
it derives, or fails to derive, from it. In the second case, Sweden in the 17th century
is not the same as Sweden after 1815, mostly because the changing power configurations
among its neighbors had rendered it militarily insignificant.)

Luard then assumes that states vary in their motives and behavior and then wants to
examine the causes of these differences. However, greater emphasis is placed on the
different international societies in different time periods. This is because
"competition and conflict among states is to a large extent determined by the aspirations
and values, the conceptions of status and the measures of success, which are established
within particular international societies" (p. 15). The environment influences behavior
by creating expectations and beliefs about the conduct of others. Since the international
environment is not static, and because the kinds of wars that occur vary from one age
to another, Luard even claims that "there exists no single phenomenon of 'war'... 
War, in other words, may be a different kind of institution, and perform a different
social function, in different international societies" (p. 16). 

Remark. It seems that the technology of war determines the kinds of conflict
that can occur, along with its decisiveness, cost, duration, and predictability. This
is what may influence beliefs and expectations, rather than some vague norms. Luard's
division predictably follows accepted lines, but it is not clear that the avowed causes
of wars were not simply excuses (A.J.P. Taylor certainly does not believe in the
17th century religious motives of the wars in Germany.)

Luard's study examines six factors that are deemed important:

    

  1. issues --- what do nations fight about (NB: "nations" is in the text (p. 17) and
it is not clear how the question applies to pre-Napoleonic wars);

  2. motives --- what it is that nations want most (NB: how does this differ from 1)?

  3. decision-making procedures --- how do nations decide to go to war;

  4. beliefs about profitability of war;

  5. international procedures for conflict resolution or limiting of war;

  6. societal attitude toward war.




The Four Historical Periods



The Age of Dynasties (1400-1559). The dominant ideology concerned itself with dynastic
competition, and thus wars of this age were conflicts between families, not states. Since
there existed no organized society of states, the total number of political units capable of
fighting was very large. Add to this the weakness of individual states, with rulers generally
lacking military power of financial independence, and we end with "private wars" (p. 29).
However, as rulers gradually centralized their power domestically, internal conflict declined,
and even external fighting was reduced (in the West, not in the East against the Turks).
Most wars were slow, protracted, and indecisive. Casualties were not generally high. Wars
not fought by alliances, but bilaterally, with opportunistic temporary switching (p. 34).

The Age of Religions (1559-1648).



@BOOK{luard-87:war,
    TITLE     = {War in International Society: A Study in International Sociology},
    AUTHOR    = {Evan Luard},
    YEAR      = {1987},
    PUBLISHER = {Yale University Press},
    ADDRESS   = {New Haven},
    ISBN      = {0-300-04016-4},
    NOTES     = {Pp. 468, index, list of wars 1400-1984},
}